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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

15 August 1956

STAFF MEMORANDUM No. 65-56

SUBJECT: Proposed Follow-up NIE on Impact of Soviet Trade and Aid Offensive in Underdeveloped Areas.

1. Early this year we concluded that the nature and likely impact of the new Bloc "trade and aid" offensive, and other aspects of the new Bloc policy, deserved intensive estimative coverage. Our first effort along these lines was NIE 100-3-56 (24 April) on Sino-Soviet Policy and Its Probable Effects in Underdeveloped Areas. Since then we have briefly covered various aspects of this problem in NIE 11-4-56 and other country papers.

2. In view of the many developments since April it is not too early for us to start thinking about doing another NIE addressed primarily to this problem, for completion by around the end of the year. Even though 100-3-56 is less than four months old (and would be only eight months old by December), it was only a first approximation and we have accumulated since much useful intelligence on Bloc activities and on local reactions to them (in Burma, Indonesia, Laos, Cambodia, Egypt, etc.). Moreover, on a subject of this importance it might be advantageous to have a series of follow-up estimates which would keep the policy-maker broadly informed as to how well the Soviets are doing, what the reactions have been, and whether our prognostications have changed. Though the O/RR bi-weekly series is a valuable current roundup, it does not suffice for this purpose and could be usefully supplemented by a periodic NIE.

3. What I have in mind is a sort of "progress report" on 100-3-56, briefly recapitulating: (a) what the Bloc has done since 100-3 was published, and current trends in its policies; (b) major reactions to date; and (c) our current views as to the potential impact of the Bloc programs [this need be no more than a short reprise of the pertinent portions of 100-3 if we have no further thoughts on the subject]. A follow-up NIE of this sort would keep the policy-maker's attention focussed on the magnitude and potential impact of Soviet moves in this key cold war arena, at a time when they will be considering desirable counter-moves.

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4. If the above proposal seems acceptable, I suggest we ask [REDACTED] (who will be with us shortly) to develop a more detailed rationale and Terms of Reference, aimed at a late 4th Quarter NIE.

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[REDACTED]

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